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ABSTRACT
Whether and how violence can be controlled to spare innocent lives is a central issue in
international relations. The most ambitious effort to date has been the International Criminal
Court (ICC), designed to enhance security and safety by preventing egregious human rights
abuses and deterring international crimes. We offer the first systematic assessment of the ICC’s
deterrent effects for both state and non-state actors. While no institution can deter all actors, the
ICC can deter some governments and those rebel groups that seek legitimacy. We find support
for this conditional impact of the ICC cross-nationally. Our work has implications for the study
of international relations and institutions, and supports the violence-reducing role of pursuing
justice in international affairs.

One of the most important questions in international policy and research is whether
justice is possible in a system dominated by self-regarding sovereign states. The International
Criminal Court (ICC) provides a challenging opportunity to probe the possibilities for
international law to reduce human suffering in inter- and intra-state conflict. The Court has
jurisdiction in a domain where military and strategic logic generally prevails, though it does not
have its own police force and must instead rely on domestic law enforcement or third parties to
arrest people charged with crimes under its jurisdiction. The ICC’s task is inherently difficult: it
can prosecute state agents, including heads of state, as well as non-state actors such as rebel
group leaders over whom international institutions traditionally have scant authority. Its goals are
3

ambitious: the attainment of peace and security, as well as justice for those who commit
atrocities. Is the Court contributing to achieving these goals, as its original drafters envisioned?
In particular, under what conditions can the ICC reduce egregious human rights violations
against civilians?
The question of the ICC’s impact is important because the court has the authority to
enforce international law against those who commit the most serious and systematic crimes. We
examine the ICC’s ability to deter one of the most dastardly international crimes: the widespread
and intentional killing of civilians in states that have experienced civil wars in their recent past.
We take a broad view of deterrence and explicate both its prosecutorial as well as social
dimensions. Prosecutorial deterrence is a direct consequence of legal punishment: it holds when
potential perpetrators reduce or avoid law-breaking for fear of being tried and officially punished.
Social deterrence is a consequence of the broader social milieu in which actors operate: it occurs
when potential perpetrators calculate the informal consequences of law-breaking.
A judicial institution is at its most powerful when prosecutorial and social deterrence
reinforce one another, which happens when actors threaten to impose extra-legal costs for noncompliance with legal authority. Recognizing this complementary relationship between formal
prosecution and informal compliance pressures, we argue that the ICC’s influence may go well
beyond the common assertion that the institution has no teeth. There are multiple mechanisms –
legal and social, international and domestic – associated with the ICC’s authority that can
potentially deter law violation in countries prone to civil violence.
At the same time, we acknowledge what few would have doubted: the ICC’s contribution
to deterrence is conditional. On average, it has stronger positive effects on governments than on
rebels. We also acknowledge that the ICC has so far had little effect in some countries where it
4

has intervened with indictments (Sudan and Libya, for example), but in other cases, ICC
jurisdiction has mobilized domestic actors and stimulated important domestic reforms (weak yet
notable improvements can be seen in Uganda, Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire, for example). Overall,
our results contrast with the predictions of those who view the ICC as a worthless institution – or
worse.

Research on the Effects of the ICC
There are many standards by which international criminal justice institutions such as the
ICC can be judged. They may be evaluated based on their contribution to justice, 1 on their
normative value, 2 on their capacity to offer societal “atonement,” 3 and on their legitimacy in the
eyes of local victims. 4 As a “renewed commitment to international idealism,” 5 the ICC almost
by definition raises hopes and expectations beyond anything we have seen since the Nuremburg
and Tokyo trials. And yet its critics are rife. Some view it as incapable of calibrating threats and
rewards to coerce an end to wartime atrocities. 6 Others see it as an institution whose success is
regularly frustrated by local and regional politics. 7
Some of the most heated debates over the ICC relate to the effect it may have on the
dynamics of peacemaking. For example, Snyder and Vinjamuri argue that international
prosecutions can discourage pragmatic bargaining between warring parties and block the use of
amnesty that could usher in peace. 8 Similarly, Goldsmith and Krasner warn that “the ICC could
1

Goodman and Jinks 2003.
Bass 2003.
3
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Clark 2011.
5
Goldsmith and Krasner 2003, 48.
6
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7
Mueller 2014.
8
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2
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initiate prosecutions that aggravate bloody political conflicts and prolong political instability in
the affected regions.” 9 Practically no systematic evidence has been produced to date to support
such concerns. In fact, other studies have found suggestive evidence that a government’s
ratification of the ICC tends to be correlated with a pause in civil war hostilities 10 or reduction in
human rights violations. 11 Sikkink’s research on domestic trials suggests that prosecutions have
been associated with human rights improvements. Certainly, the history of impunity has hardly
racked up a stunning record for peace. 12 There may be some cases in which the unreasonable
insistence on prosecution could be antithetical to the more practical idea of making deals and
compromising with atrocity offenders, and we do not deny that carefully calibrated amnesties
may in some circumstances support peace processes, 13 but as a general matter there is little
evidence to suggest the peace versus justice tradeoff is anything other than a false dichotomy.
A related but distinct issue is whether the ICC can deter the specific crimes it is designed
to address. After all, the ICC does not outlaw war; it outlaws specific violations of the laws of
war, those “limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole” including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 14 Does the ICC deter such
crimes by raising the risk of punishment for the worst offenses? Again, skeptics abound.
Goldsmith and Krasner assert flatly that to think the ICC may saves lives “is wishful thinking.” 15
Ku and Nzelibe argue that ICC deterrence is undercut because it depends on states’ willingness
to cooperate and cannot impose the death penalty. 16 Cronin-Furman similarly concludes that the
9
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absence of severe punishment and low probability of capture makes the ICC deterrent effect
weak. 17 Fish calls the ICC’s deterrent effect “weak” 18 and “speculative” 19 while Ainley calls it
“as yet unproven.” 20 Specialists in criminal justice point out that the ICC simply does not have
the resources to make punishment a real risk. 21 We would simply point out the inconsistency
among some of the ICC’s most ardent critics: it is odd to argue that the court’s weakness renders
it unable to deter crime, and yet to claim that the Court exacerbates conflict by (credibly,
apparently) threatening to punish perpetrators, who are thereby supposedly incentivized to elude
justice and continue fighting.
Our investigation avoids generalized claims and instead advances conditional arguments
about ICC deterrence, flowing both from its formal authority to prosecute and its focal power as
a socially relevant justice institution. We are careful to craft arguments conditional on who is
expected to be deterred. We argue first that ICC jurisdiction increases the risk of prosecution
compared to impunity, and that this can deter some individuals from committing crimes,
especially when the ICC signals its will and capacity to prosecute. But acknowledging the
uncertainty of being tried and punished, we argue the ICC is more likely to deter actors when
they are sensitive to social pressure. Actors who are concerned with their legitimacy in the eyes
of domestic publics and/or the international community are much more likely to be deterred by
the possibility of ICC prosecution than those who are not.

A Theory of the ICC’s Conditional Impact

17
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How can an international institution with broad legal authority to enforce the law, but
only limited material capacity, influence the course of civil war violence? We specify two broad
channels of deterrence: prosecutorial deterrence and social deterrence. Prosecutorial deterrence
works via anticipated legalized, court-ordered punishment. Social deterrence results from extralegal social costs associated with law violation. Both of these channels can be accommodated in
a framework that views the propensity to commit a crime as a function of the likelihood of
getting caught and the cost of punishment, broadly understood. 22 This framework assumes, of
course, that potential perpetrators are aware of and can weigh risks, costs and benefits, and
update their assessments over time.

Prosecutorial Deterrence
Prosecutorial deterrence refers to the omission of a criminal act out of fear of sanctions
resulting from legal prosecution. People are increasingly likely to be deterred from violating the
law when the chances and severity of a legal sanction, such as a fine, incarceration or capital
punishment, increases. As such, law violation is a function of prosecution and sentencing; as the
risk of more severe penalties is perceived to increase, the likelihood that an individual will
commit a crime is reduced and the crime rate falls (holding any “utility” resulting from the
violation constant).
For decades, the criminal deterrence literature has debated the question of exactly which
elements of this rationalist model account for the deterrence of criminal behavior. The idea that
severity of punishment largely drives deterrence 23 fueled the move toward harsher sentencing in
the United States in the 1980s. However, a growing consensus in the deterrence literature
22
23

Becker 1968.
Grasmick and Bryjak 1980.
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suggests that the swiftness and especially the likelihood of punishment may more effectively
deter crime than severity of punishment. 24 Empirical researchers employing surveys,
experiments and scenarios also conclude that the likelihood of punishment is key for deterring
crimes ranging from tax evasion to theft to sexual assault. 25 Observational studies often find that
measures that raise the risk of apprehension, such as increased policing 26 or the greater presence
of cell phones 27 reduce crime.
While the criminology literature is exceptionally thin in parts of the world where ICC
jurisdiction currently looms large, many of the same themes are common. A large study affiliated
with the World Bank based on developing countries found that higher conviction rates tended to
reduce crime, even while controlling for the death penalty. 28 Major texts on criminal deterrence
in Africa agree that the key to crime control in most contexts in Africa is not the severity of
punishment, but its likelihood. 29 A growing literature on the role of courts in authoritarian states
reveals that courts can sometimes gain a good deal of independence from political actors, 30 and
thus potentially deter some kinds of lawbreaking. But even states with less robust judicial
systems where elites may have become accustomed to operating above the law, the theoretical
role of raising perceived risks of prosecution has been widely accepted as a starting point in a
wide range of contexts.
Raising the risk of punishment where the rule of law is otherwise weak is precisely the
formal role envisioned for the ICC. The Court was designed to do this through its own authority
to prosecute. The Court’s jurisdiction applies to cases of genocide, crimes against humanity,
24
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egregious human rights violations, and war crimes 31 that occurred after July 1, 2002 in the
territory of a state that has ratified the treaty or that is committed by a national of such a state or
in cases referred to it by the UN Security Council. 32 The Office of the Prosecutor ultimately
decides which cases to pursue, but cases may be referred by member states (e.g., Uganda, the
DRC, the Central African Republic, and Mali), the Security Council (Sudan and Libya), or
initiated by the prosecutor herself (Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire). Importantly, immunities of local
officials are not to be recognized by the Court. 33
Prosecutorial deterrence is possible only if the Court’s existence and actions raise the
perceived likelihood that an individual will be tried and punished. To date, the ICC prosecutor
has indicted more than 35 people, and a further 9 cases (involving Afghanistan, Honduras, Korea,
Nigeria, Colombia, Georgia, Guinea, Palestine, and Ukraine) are under preliminary examination
for jurisdiction and admissibility. Prosecutorial deterrence theory implies that investigations,
indictments and especially successful prosecutions should trigger a reassessment of the
likelihood of punishment and a boost to deterrence 34 – a result consistent with Kim and
Sikkink’s study of national human rights trials in transition countries. 35 But even if suspects are
never apprehended, one costly result of the ICC regime, as Gilligan demonstrates theoretically, is
that perpetrators have fewer asylum options, which potentially deters them from flagrant
violations. 36
The Rome Statute’s complementarity regime creates a channel for the ICC to support
prosecutorial deterrence at the national level as well. The ICC is designed to complement, and
31
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not to preempt or substitute for national prosecution. National courts have the option of
investigating a case domestically before the ICC can adjudicate it. 37 The ICC may nonetheless
find a case admissible despite domestic action if the Court determines that “the state is unwilling
or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.” 38 Sudan’s desultory
investigations and prosecutions of crimes committed in Darfur provide an example of the kind of
behavior the admissibility provisions were designed to override. 39
This complementarity principle bolsters the ICC’s prosecutorial deterrence to the extent
that it creates incentives for states to strengthen their own legal capacities. 40 The ICC report to
the United Nations notes several reforms that came after the launch of preliminary examinations,
including reforms in Guinea, Colombia, and Georgia. 41 Nouwen documents how ICC
investigations catalyzed legal reforms in the DRC and Sudan. 42 Uganda’s ICC-implementing
legislation was passed only recently, in 2010, but it empowers the Ugandan High Court to
prosecute international crimes. 43 Thus, an indirect channel through which the ICC may exert
prosecutorial deterrence is through stimulating national courts to act, 44 theoretically creating
favorable conditions for internal monitoring and law enforcement, bolstering prosecutorial
deterrence. Arguably, national courts have contributed to a broader system-wide expectation that
impunity is no longer quietly tolerated. 45

37
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In sum, prosecutorial deterrence is expected to be enhanced by any condition that makes
prosecution more likely in a given jurisdiction, such as ratification of the Rome Statutes, passage
of ICC-implementing legislation, national trials, or court reforms that make trials more probable
and credible. 46 Qualitative research reveals such changes become part of leaders’ updated
calculations. For example, former Colombian President Andrés Pastrana expressed concerns that
he might get prosecuted by the ICC, and the paramilitary leader, Vincente Castano, of the
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), was “sharply aware and fearful of the possibility of
ICC prosecution, a fear that reportedly directly contributed to his demobilization.” 47 Even some
rebel groups have begun to assess risks in the ICC’s shadow. For example, the two main rebel
groups in Colombia – the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC-EP) and the
Unión Camilista - Ejército de Liberación Nacional (UC-ELN) – have published internal
documents assessing the likelihood of prosecution by the ICC or domestic courts. 48 ICC
investigations, indictments and convictions or those triggered by complementarity are likely to
encourage actual or potential perpetrators to reassess the risks of punishment – relative to the
status quo, which is often impunity – and to moderate their behavior.

Social Deterrence
A narrow focus on prosecution is likely to underestimate the full deterrent effect of the
Court. The ICC is the institutional manifestation of a movement, years in the making, to punish
international crimes and to put them firmly beyond the pale. Quite aside from its formal power to

46

On the phenomenon of “enforcement spillovers,” by which monitoring and enforcement increases compliance
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47
Grono 2012.
48
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prosecute, the Court’s legal mandate signals the nature and strength of community norms. 49
When community norms are challenged in a clear way (signaled, for example, by ICC actions or
statements), there is significant potential for a social reaction to law violations.
The concept of social deterrence has been central to behavioral models in criminology for
decades. 50 In their research on criminal behavior, Zimring and Hawkins noted long ago that
threatened consequences include “social reactions that may provide potential offenders with
more reason to avoid conviction than the officially imposed unpleasantness of punishment.” 51
Experimental research suggests that potential offenders are often deterred from violating the law
more as a result of the anticipated social response than the likelihood of prosecution and
punishment by formal legal processes. 52 Indeed some studies conclude that “the extralegal
consequences from conviction appear to be at least as great a deterrent as the legal
consequences.” 53 Social deterrence depends for its effectiveness on the expression of clear
standards of behavior as well as enhanced monitoring. 54 Kahan emphasizes that law signals
information about what a broader community values. 55 The willingness of a community to
defend its values informally must be taken into account by a would-be offender.
The social consequences of violation can range from the psychic costs of stigmatization
to the material costs of being shunned from profitable relationships. The central characteristic of
social deterrence is its informal, extralegal character, as distinct from the likelihood of formal
prosecution. One social cost of a common crime might be that it is harder to get a job, not
because one would be legally barred, but because many people do not want to hire – or even to
49

Kahan 1997.
See Williams and Hawkins 1986; and McCarthy 2002.
51
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52
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54
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55
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be seen to hire – a criminal. Social deterrence, as this example illustrates, does not correspond
directly to material versus intangible sanctions. In the theory we advance, extrajudicial actors
may shun or shame offenders; those with resources may potentially deploy material pressures
extralegally to advance community values. Importantly, this range of informal social pressure is
both elicited and legitimated by the normative focal power of a criminal tribunal.
Social deterrence is a central feature of research on compliance with international human
rights norms, which are notoriously difficult to enforce internationally. That literature recognizes
that international norms are largely enforced through extralegal means: by transnational
organizations that publicize violations and ally with states and international organizations to
condemn them. 56 Hafner-Burton emphasizes international social pressures backed by economic
sanctions. 57 One conclusion to which the human rights literature clearly points is the central
importance of extralegal deterrents to law violation. More broadly, social deterrence is
emphasized in compliance research where legitimacy of rules and authority plays a critical role
in deterring crimes and inducing compliance. 58 In fact, it may be especially relevant precisely
when norms are strong but the formal institutions of law – policing, courts, and formal
confinement capacities – are weak.
The concept of social deterrence has largely been missing from accounts of how and why
the ICC is a potentially powerful institution. This relative silence is ironic since one key purpose
of the ICC is to set expectations, thereby placing some tactics outside the boundary of acceptable
behavior. As the world’s first permanent and global criminal court, the ICC is especially central
in defining international society’s response to international crimes. In this spirit, Koskenniemi

56
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views international criminal trials as enabling the formation of a “moral community,” 59 while
Akhavan refers to the “socio-pedagogical influence of judicial stigmatization,” 60 which he
characterizes as subtle, but potentially quite far-reaching.
Our argument about the capacity of the ICC to stimulate social deterrence is compatible
with this literature. Law violation in the presence of ICC authority crosses a fairly bright line that
the international community as a whole values and therefore has an interest in maintaining. State
officials and rebel groups vary in their sensitivity to the values of the international community;
integration into global networks and dependence on the approval of foreign actors critical to
strengthening the ICC in the first place 61 may well enhance external social deterrence.
Domestic communities may be also highly relevant to social deterrence, as is welldocumented in the human rights literature. Simmons argues for the importance of domestic
mobilization for deterring human rights violations of ratified treaties. 62 Parties to a civil conflict
must consider their ability to maintain support from civilian populations and their own troops in
the event of an ICC investigation. A war crime accusation could severely damage a
government’s or rebel group’s relationship with domestic populations. Civil societies may be
emboldened by the ICC to mobilize for some form of justice, petitioning the cases to national
courts and potentially providing evidence to the ICC. 63
We are not suggesting that all civil society members will want to turn to the ICC. In
Uganda, for example, Acholi leaders suggested traditional restorative justice rather than the
ICC, 64 but even in this case, the ICC galvanized the local discussion on accountability norms and
59
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(as intended by the ICC’s complementarity principle) stimulated domestic demands for reform of
the justice system. 65 Scholars have also documented the supportive role of civil society actors
during ICC investigations in the Central African Republic. 66 In Kenya, some supporters of
Kenyatta and Ruto quite obviously did not want the ICC to try their leaders 67 and the
government commenced a relentless campaign against the ICC (to include Kenya’s withdrawal
from the institution). Even so, in late 2011 nearly 60 percent of Kenyans supported the ICC
process, rising to nearly 70 percent in Nairobi and 86 percent in the Nyanza region. Moreover,
77 per cent of Kenyans polled said they had followed the ICC proceedings naming the Ocampo
Six very closely. 68 These cases illustrate why it may be important to supplement an
understanding of the ICC’s prosecutorial deterrence power with its broader ability to mobilize
extralegal pressures. As the ICC takes action, it not only raises expectations of prosecution; it
shapes social expectations about what constitutes justice more broadly.

Theoretical Expectations
Our analysis suggests that the ICC’s effects may be much more nuanced than discussions
of its formal capacities recognize. The ICC may have varying effects on different categories of
actors, depending on (1) their exposure to the risk of prosecution and (2) the importance they
attach – or the vulnerability they believe they have – to the social costs of criminal law violation.
First, we expect prosecutorial deterrence to depend on state ratification, which is the
primary mechanism for the Court to gain jurisdiction. The absolute risk of punishment by the
ICC remains small, but it is not negligible and is much higher than was the case when impunity
65
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was the default. Of course, government and rebel forces may believe that prosecution is a
remote possibility and may be more sensitive to risks of crude retribution by their enemies than
to the threat of ICC prosecution. Or, a government may have ratified to make rebel prosecution
more likely, 69 which does not affect the jurisdictional fact that to do so brings the government
under ICC scrutiny as well. While the calculations of individual actors may be complex and
attenuated, our theoretical expectation is clear: a reduction in the commission of ICC crimes
post-ratification is consistent with expectations based on direct prosecutorial deterrence.
We make this argument fully aware that states consciously select into treaties in the first
place. States may have ratified the ICC for a number of reasons. Simmons and Danner have
argued that two kinds of states have been especially likely to ratify ICC statutes: 70 peaceful
democracies for whom ratification is likely to be relatively costless 71 but also states with a
history of civil wars and weak institutions, for whom making a credible commitment to reduce
violence via ratification may be especially valuable. Cultural sources of acceptance and
resistance also abound. Areas of the world that have adopted western legal forms, such as Latin
America and parts of Africa, have been willing to ratify the Rome statutes, but ratification in
Asia, for example, has been explained by a “disconnect between formalized justice processes (as
exhibited in the ICC) and indigenous or embedded manners of resolving conflict.” 72 External
sources of pressure to ratify should also not be overlooked. A number of studies have found
external economic dependence to be a significant explanation for ICC ratification. 73 For our
purposes, the most significant threat to our ability to draw inferences about ICC deterrence is

69
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likely related to domestic political developments that both encourage ratification and a shift
away from domestic violence, such as liberal domestic reform.
Prosecutorial deterrence should also increase as the court demonstrates its will and
capacity to prosecute. Governments, military officials, and rebel leaders within the Court’s
jurisdiction are expected to consider new evidence of the Court’s authority and the prosecutor’s
determination to investigate, indict, and convict. For example, the M23 rebel group in the DRC
publicly expressed its willingness to adhere to international humanitarian law in the aftermath of
Lubanga’s conviction, and appears to have moderated the extent of war crimes and strengthened
its soldiers’ discipline in the wake of that case. 74 If this example can be generalized, we should
expect a public display of the Court’s power to strengthen direct prosecutorial deterrence. The
most powerful boost to deterrence is likely to be within the situation to which the Court’s action
pertains, but could influence actors more broadly, 75 since such interventions display globally the
authority and determination of the institution to act. ICC crimes should diminish when the Court
begins an investigation, indicts, or convicts.
The ICC may exert prosecutorial deterrence indirectly as well. The complementarity
mechanism creates incentives for states to develop their own capacity to investigate and try ICC
crimes. 76 Dancy and Sikkink have shown that when states ratify human rights treaties that
require them to prosecute violators, states are in fact more likely to hold domestic trials. 77
Similarly, we expect ICC crimes to decrease when states implement ICC-consistent statutes,
when they improve their courts’ capacity to try war criminals, and when they build military
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capacities to detect and punish international crimes. 78 It is possible that some states adopt ICCstatutes in their national laws without intending to improve their criminal justice systems. But a
number of recent studies suggest that ICC-required reforms have been important in holding
human rights violators accountable. 79
One of our primary expectations is that extralegal social pressures deter international
crime as well. These mechanisms are highly conditional: they depend on the existence of salient
groups or networks who matter to the target, and who have the ability to apply costly social
pressure. 80 In terms of materially backed social sanctions, we expect state actors that are more
dependent on foreign assistance to be more likely to be deterred from using tactics that are a
clear violation of international criminal law. 81 But social pressure need not be backed by
material coercion. We also expect state actors to be deterred by mobilization pressures from
domestic and international human rights organizations. 82 Domestic groups draw attention to
official actions, raising legitimacy challenges that, at a minimum, have the potential to increase
the costs to government actors of maintaining power. Where human rights mobilization is more
intense locally, government officials and military forces should be more deterred from
committing international crimes, especially if state officials have raised behavioral expectations
by ratifying the ICC’s statutes.
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Unlike state actors, rebel groups rarely have formal institutional mechanisms to
participate in the creation of international law or to commit themselves to international norms. 83
Vague awareness of the ICC’s jurisdiction, an ability to hide in rough terrain, and in some cases
exceptional brutality contribute to a weaker expectation of deterrence for many rebel groups.
Nonetheless, in theory, the ICC has changed the legal context in which rebels operate as well.
On the one hand, like state officers, rebels may be formally subject to enhanced prosecutorial
deterrence, since the ICC has the power to investigate situations involving both state and nonstate actors within its jurisdiction. In fact, among the individuals indicted by the ICC, 84 about
half are rebel group leaders. On the other hand, rebel groups may not be as well informed as
government officials of the Court’s operation, which could attenuate prosecutorial deterrence
effects.
Our social deterrence theory predicts that some rebels may be more deterrable than
others. Secessionist groups, for example, need to cultivate international legitimacy. Recent
research suggests they therefore tend to abide by international humanitarian law and refrain from
civilian abuse, relative to non-secessionist groups. 85 This is despite the fact that separatist civil
wars tend to be brutal and long-lasting, generating many battle-related deaths between
combatants. 86 Furthermore, secessionist groups are more likely to be aware of international
affairs and to conduct international diplomacy than are non-secessionist counterparts. 87
Consistent with the civil war literature, we would expect any deterrent effect to be stronger to the
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extent that such groups are able to exert strong command and control over their troops. 88 Table
1 summarizes our hypotheses.

[Table 1 about here]

Prosecutorial and social deterrence effects are not necessarily completely independent
influences. Prosecutorial deterrence can shape social deterrence over time as investigations,
arrests, and convictions reinforce broadly shared values, which sharpens the focal power of an
institution such as the ICC. Heightened social sensitivity can in turn strengthen prosecutorial
deterrence when civil society actors push for legal reforms and cooperate by reporting, testifying
and producing evidence in legal proceedings. The international community created the ICC, after
all, because it wants crimes against civilian populations to stop. Prosecutorial and social
deterrence are mutually reinforcing, but the latter can matter even if the former is statistically
unlikely.

Empirical Investigation of the ICC’s Impacts

Sample
Studying deterrence empirically is a difficult endeavor. The first challenge is to identify a
relevant population at risk of committing a crime on a scale that might conceivably draw the
ICC’s attention. 89 We need a set of cases where atrocities seem possible, and have therefore
selected countries that had at least one episode of civil war since 1945. Civil wars are not the
88
89
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only political context that can generate ICC crimes, but they are likely to increase their
occurrence among warring parties. 90
Based on this sampling strategy, potential candidates for deterrence are found in 101
states and involve 264 rebel groups between 1989 and 2011. 91 For the case of government
violations, the unit of observation is the country-year. The resulting data structure is a balanced
panel for each country for 23 years. 92 For the case of rebels, we must account for their varying
and often shorter life span (average longevity of 4.5 years) 93 so we analyze only the years when
rebel groups were active in an unbalanced panel with each rebel group as a unit. The list of rebel
groups is from the Non-State Actor (NSA) Dataset, 94 which defines a civil war with a threshold
of 25 battle deaths. This means we are likely examining the ICC’s deterrence potential vis-à-vis
rebels that are at least moderately capable of inflicting violence.
The resulting sample includes all ICC “situations” 95 to date – Uganda, the Central
African Republic, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Kenya, Libya, and Mali. The countries in the
sample are diverse in terms of level of violence against civilians (zero to 500,000 killed),
ratification records (52 had ratified and 49 had not during our observation window), and
geographic scope (41 African countries, 20 in the Americas, 17 in Asia, 11 in the Middle East,
and 12 in Europe). The period 1989-2011 includes 13 years before the ICC was established in
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2002 and 10 years after, which allows us to assess the change before and after ICC entry into
force.

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the number of civilians killed intentionally by government
forces or rebel groups in a direct military confrontation. The data are culled based on media
reports, sourced from the One-Sided Violence (OSV) dataset. 96 The data exclude indirect events
such as unintended collateral damage, social demonstrations, or deaths from environmental
disasters. Intentionality is important for our purposes. Deliberate civilian killing, usually
generated by superior command, is an egregious rights violation, a crime against humanity, and a
war crime under ICC jurisdiction. It is clearly one of the major crimes that the ICC was designed
to deter and to punish. 97 We acknowledge it is not the only ICC crime that potentially might be
deterred, 98 but to our knowledge, it is the best available measure to assess the ICC’s impact
cross-nationally. Relative to other ICC crimes such as rape, intentional killing of civilians is
more observable and comparable across cases. 99 Significant disagreements exist about what
constitutes a legal case of genocide, 100 and it is difficult to tell the age of children when they are
recruited to military ranks, 101 making these other ICC crimes less amenable to systematic testing.
Nonetheless, if intentional civilian killing can be deterred, this should encourage further research
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into a range of heinous crimes – from sexual violence to trafficking in children to widespread
pillaging – that the ICC was meant to address. 102
In our sample, the yearly average intentional civilian killing by a government is 34,
excluding the Rwanda 1994 figure of 50,000. 103 The figure for rebel groups is 83. Government
killing does occasionally occur in non-civil-war years; Kenya’s 2007-2008 election violence is
one such example. Since OSV data include any case that generates more than 25 civilian
fatalities. Its standard is different from the definition of civil war given by the Armed Conflict
Dataset, which is more than 25 battle deaths. 104 Consequently, our dataset includes 30% civil
war years and about 70% non-civil-war years. About 27% of the civil war years and 3% of the
non-civil-war years in the sample had government-perpetrated civilian killings, corroborating our
claim that civil wars are breeding grounds for ICC crimes, while showing that they can occur
(though rarely) during non-civil-war years as well. For the years where OSV data do not specify
civilian killing counts, we assume zero counts for civilian killing. 105

Independent Variables
We test for direct prosecutorial deterrence with two indicators. One is whether or not the
state has ratified the Rome Statutes (ICC Ratification), which we expect to be associated with the
reduction in civilian killing by government actors. The second indicator is what we call ICC
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Actions. This is a three-year moving average of the collective counts of preliminary examinations,
investigations, and arrest warrants announced by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), up to the
previous year. 106 This variable signals to actors globally the determination of the OTP to
prosecute, and we expect it to be associated with the reduction of intentional civilian killing by
both governments and rebels over time.
Indirect prosecutorial deterrence via complementarity is captured by Domestic Crime
Statute, which ranges from 0 (no domestic crime statute dealing with international crimes in
place), 1 (existing domestic crime statute), 2 (minor reform) to 3 (substantial reform). 107 Since
these cases of legal reform may face difficulties in implementation in societies with weak legal
institutions,108 we control for the Rule of Law indicator published by the World Bank. 109 We
expect statutory reform to help deter intentional civilian killing by increasing the perceived
likelihood of meaningful domestic prosecution.
We proxy a state official’s international susceptibility to material manifestations of social
pressure with total official development assistance. Aid Pressure is captured by the amount of
economic aid, multiplied by the reporting counts from the New York Times (reflecting donor
interest). 110 Domestically, social deterrence is likely to be less tangible and should intensify with
mobilization by human rights organizations (HROs). The growth of HROs is expected to
stimulate demands for justice, in turn raising legitimacy concerns and governing costs for state
106
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officials and military leaders who commit atrocities. The variable HRO Growth measures the
incremental number of international and domestic HROs within a country. 111 We recognize that
some human rights organizations are critical of the ICC while others support its efforts, but on
average this indicator proxies attention to human rights within a polity, capturing demands for
attention to the plight of victims and challenging the legitimacy of the perpetrator. Both Aid
Pressure and HRO Growth are interacted with ICC ratification to capture the argument that
social pressure is strongest when backed by clear expressions of community standards of
behavior, which we assume is precisely what ratification of the ICC does.
We also control for the factors that influence ratification and atrocities to ensure that it is
ICC ratification, not other factors, that reduce violence against civilians. Logic and experience
suggest that democracies are much less likely to target civilians, so we control for Political
Regime Type using Polity IV data. We also employ a binary variable, Ongoing Civil War, from
the PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset to mark years of active civil conflicts. 112 To reduce the
possibility that temporal trends affect our results, we include both year dummies and an indicator
for the presence of the Court itself, Post ICC Regime, which is zero before 2002 and 1 on and
after 2002. 113
Finally, we control for states’ preferences for and experiences with other peace and
justice institutions. A strong preference for peace and reconciliation is indicated by policy
decisions designed to curtail violent conflict and achieve peaceful conciliation, including the
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acceptance of peacekeepers 114 and the decision to institute amnesty for human rights violations
that may have been committed in the past. We first combine and then cumulate these experiences
over time, calling this variable Peace Preference. 115 A preference for justice is proxied by
policy combinations, including human rights trials and accountability via truth commissions; we
call this variable Justice Preference. 116 Trials and other forms of accountability may influence
the level of violence in a society; 117 here we deploy these accumulated experiences as indicators
of revealed preferences for justice. It is important to attempt to model these preferences in
anticipation of inevitable concerns about endogeneity that we discuss later.
Data on rebel groups’ characteristics are drawn from the Non-State Actor (NSA)
Dataset. 118 We view Secessionist Rebels as the rebel groups most likely to seek legitimacy, and
thus most susceptible to various forms of social deterrence. 119 We include rebels with autonomy
aims as well as those involved in secessionist conflicts in this category because many rebel
groups pursue both goals. Rebel Discipline captures strength of command and control with an
ordinal measure (low, moderate, high). We also include an ordinal Rebel Strength scale to
control for the military strength of rebel groups relative to government (much weaker, weaker,
equal, stronger, much stronger). All other variables are the same as in the government analysis.
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We first present the results from our analysis of intentional civilian killing by
governments and then move to the analysis of rebel groups. We use random effects panel
analysis as our key estimation approach. 120 Missing data were imputed to increase efficiency and
reduce bias. 121

Results
Government Forces
Table 2 presents the results for government forces. Consistent with our hypothesis about
prosecutorial deterrence, the significant and negative incidence-rate ratio 122 suggests that
ratification reduces the intentional civilian killing by a factor of .531, compared to nonratification. 123 For example, if, hypothetically, 100 civilians were killed by a non-ratifying
government, our estimates suggest about 53 civilians are likely to be killed, assuming ratification
with all other control variables held constant (see Figure 1). All specifications control for core
predictors for civilian killing such as the nature of the political regime, ongoing civil war,
intentional rebel killing of civilians (to account for the possibility of reciprocity as well as for
trends in violence over time), and an indicator for before and after the ICC came into force.
Surprisingly, these models suggest that regime type is not likely to explain intentional civilian
killing, though active civil wars certainly do. Governments are also much more likely to commit
violence against civilians when rebels do so, which suggests that ICC deterrence may contribute
to breaking cycles of violence committed on both sides of a conflict.
120
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[Figure 1 about here]
[Table 2 about here]

Model 2 looks at the effect of ICC Actions, the three-year moving average of previous
preliminary examinations, investigations, and warrants by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).
According to the incidence-rate ratio based on Model 2, one additional investigation each year
over the three-year term is estimated to reduce intentional civilian killing by a factor of 0.570.
(See Table 1 for an estimate of lives spared, which is substantial). Note that the significant effect
of ICC Actions is robust even after including Post-ICC Regime, a variable that captures the
Court’s existence, but not its actions. It is therefore quite unlikely that the effect of ICC Actions
is merely an artifact of some general violence-reducing temporal trend or the result of a passive
court. Rather, ICC Actions represent new information, available to all actors, demonstrating that
the ICC is operational, authoritative, and that the prosecutor means to bring perpetrators to
justice.
What of complementarity? Model 3 demonstrates that improvements in Domestic Crime
Statutes – which are themselves influenced by the presence of the ICC 124 – are also associated
with reduced civilian killing. This effect is robust to the control of Rule of Law, suggesting that it
is not merely the capacity to enforce but the substantive legal change that is critical. One
categorical shift toward stronger ICC-consistent domestic legal reform is estimated to reduce
civilian killing by a factor of 0.61, the substantive impact of which is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Importantly, ratification of the ICC itself has significantly contributed to these reforms.
Knowing the ICC may step in where domestic institutions fail seems to have encouraged
domestic legal change, which in turn helps to deter at least some intentional violence against
civilians by government forces. Model 4 includes all ICC prosecutorial effects simultaneously.
It demonstrates that ratification, ICC signals of strength via prosecutorial actions, and
complementarity have all contributed to significant reductions in intentional civilian killing.
Our second main hypothesis is that state actors can be socially deterred. Extralegal social
pressure at the domestic level is most likely to be of the non-material sort; e.g., challenges to the
justness and legitimacy of actions taken by government agents. These challenges are
hypothesized to be strongest where law focuses social expectations and draws bright lines that
distinguish unacceptable behavior. The interaction term in Model 5 tests this idea. It shows that
in addition to whatever effect ratification alone may have, human rights groups are able to
capitalize on ICC norms to further hold governments accountable to civil society when their state
has ratified the Rome Statute. The combination of ICC ratification and growth in human rights
mobilization, captured by the interaction term, is associated with less intentional killing (i.e. a
negative coefficient), likely through social deterrence but also because human rights
organizations contribute to prosecutorial risks. Our goal is not to disentangle these effects, but to
illustrate that they are in fact mutually reinforcing. Interestingly, in the absence of ICC
ratification, human rights organizations appear to have far less traction.
Figure 2 plots marginal effects of HRO Growth conditional on ratification, based on the
estimates from Model 5. The graph shows the change in the predicted count of civilians killed as
mobilization increases. Since the number of HROs increases about 2 per year on average and
standard deviation is about 25, we report the graph within 2 standard deviations, from -50 to 50
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organizations. The marginal effects remain negative between -2 and -7 throughout the entire
range [-50, 50], indicating that HRO Growth generally decreases civilian killings. But this civil
society effect is substantially magnified by the focal power and jurisdiction of the ICC: the slope
given ratification is steeper and more negative than for non-ratifying states. With ICC ratification,
adding one more human rights organization is estimated to reduce intentional killing by between
3 and 6 civilians. Without ICC ratification, the effect of increases in HROs is almost flat.
Theoretically, this is what we would expect if civil society organizations use highly focal legal
values to hold governments more accountable for their actions.
Of course, it is possible that both ICC Ratification and HRO Growth are attributable to
some third factor, such as political liberalization. To address what is essentially a form of
potential omitted variable bias, we control for political regime type in Table 2 and further
explore this broader reform thesis in the online appendix using Freedom House measures of
changes in civil liberties. The evidence suggests that the connection between ratification and
mobilization is likely not spurious: even controlling for broader governance changes (obviously
not attributable to ICC ratification), the growth in the number of HROs is strongly connected to
the reduction in civilian killing only when a state has ratified the ICC statutes. 125

[Figure 2 about here]

At the international level, social deterrence may be supported through economic
dependency relationships. Our results show that while aid itself is not systematically associated
with a reduction of violence, governments that ratified the ICC Statute were subsequently much
125
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more likely to reduce or to refrain from intentional civilian violence the more aid they received
(Model 6). As Figure 3 illustrates, increasing aid reduces violence more with ICC ratification
than without. Social pressures – in this case, the possibility of losing aid – appear to provide
important support for international norms. In contrast, without ratification, increasing aid has
little marginal effect. Similarly, ICC ratification has much weaker effects when states receive no
foreign aid at all. Social deterrence operates precisely under these interactive conditions: when
extralegal pressures interact with accepted, focal norms.

[Figure 3 about here]

Model 7 contains all the ICC-related variables as well as two key proxies for underlying
preferences for peace and for justice. By including these proxies, we are attempting to show that
changing underlying proclivities toward peace and justice alone cannot explain the deterrent
effects we are trying to isolate. Model 7 shows that these two preference proxies do significantly
influence the likelihood that governments will target civilians. In particular, experience with
justice and accountability institutions (trials and truth commissions) are correlated with reduced
killing, while the opposite seems to be true of efforts to reconcile and establish peace. But even
when we control for such preferences and experiences, our central finding is the same: the ICC
continues to exert independent deterrence effects of approximately the same magnitude. There is
a slight decrease in the estimated effect of Domestic Crime Statue reforms, but the sign is
strongly negative and nearly statistically significant.
The evidence of the ICC’s ability to deter is based on rigorous controls for many
underlying conditions that could plausibly contribute both to ratification and reduced civilian
32

killing, such as changing regime type, quality of the rule of law, government-rebel reciprocity
regarding civilians, even changing experiences and preferences with respect to peace and justice.
But there may still be concerns that ICC ratification is not causally related to civilian violence.
One possibility is that some ratifying countries were already in the process of halting civilian
killing by the late 1990s, and therefore might have selected themselves into ratification. 126 To
account for this potential source of endogeneity, we conduct matching analysis to control for
important characteristics that may lead some states to ratify in the first place. Using a coarsened
exact matching algorithm, 127 we find results similar to our panel analysis. 128 We recognize that
matching does not completely solve the problem of selection on unobservables. But matching
does show that the net effect of ratification and ICC-related interventions are strongly
discernable after controlling for selection into ratification, getting a balanced sample via
matching between treatment (ratification-years) and control (non-ratification-years), and
estimating the differences between these cases.
A second potential threat to inference is the temporal trend of violence. Critics might
suspect that our results are primarily due to the less brutal nature of more recent conflicts, 129
rather than the ICC itself. However, we find no particular trend in overall violence between
1989 and 2011 (Figure 4). Average battle-related deaths world-wide have consistently hovered
around 500 per year during the last two decades, albeit with a slightly decreasing trend.
Moreover, the results are robust to the inclusion of period and year dummies. The results in
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support of ICC deterrence are not likely simply a reflection of a decreasingly violent climate. 130
Collectively, the evidence is highly suggestive that the ICC has influenced government tactics
when it comes to civilian violence. We now analyze whether the ICC has influenced the
behavior of non-state actors.

[Figure 4 about here]

Rebel Groups
Rebel groups are likely to be the most difficult case for ICC deterrence. Rebels rarely
participate in norm consolidation during international negotiations. They are not directly
responsible to any constituency, have varying motives from secession to self-enrichment, and
often are located in regions that make their crimes difficult to investigate. If indicted, they are
notoriously hard to apprehend. In the early days of the ICC many rebel groups might not have
been informed of its jurisdiction or even its existence, although that is changing.
Table 3 reports the results of civilian killing by rebel groups in a way analogous to that of
governments in Table 2. It is clear that formal legal change apparently makes no impression on
rebel groups generally. Neither ICC Ratification (Model 1) nor Domestic Crime Statute (Model 3)
appears to reduce rebel civilian killing. However, even rebel groups appear to respond to ICC
Actions (Model 2). Rebels do not respond to legal change alone; they are much more impressed
with action. The effects are borne out consistently in Model 4, which includes all ICC
prosecutorial risks. Rebels tend to behave as though they update their estimates of their chances
of prosecution when the ICC demonstrates its resolve through investigations, warrants and
130
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prosecutions. The incidence-rate ratio for ICC Action is .830 [.747, .923]. 131 Figure 1 illustrates
the estimated impact for a hypothetical rebel group responsible for some 100 civilian deaths. We
estimate that in such a case about 17 individuals might be spared through the deterrent effects
flowing from investigative and prosecutorial actions by the ICC. This suggests that rebels are
likely to alter their tactics in light of new evidence that the prosecutor’s office intends to hold
actors accountable for their atrocities.
Models 5 and 6 attempt to capture social deterrence among rebel groups. Rebel groups
with secessionist aims are in general likely to kill fewer civilians than those without such aims
(Model 5). We use a triple interaction among Secessionist Rebels, Rebel Discipline, and Post
ICC Regime in Model 6 to test the idea that secessionist rebels with internal discipline further
reduce their violence after the ICC regime is in place. The triple interaction term is negative and
weakly significant, indicating some evidence of social deterrence for a particular class of rebel
groups. The substantive effects suggest some possibility of social deterrence among rebel groups.
For example, our estimate suggests that a hypothetical well-organized secessionist movement
that would have used tactics intentionally leading to the deaths of 100 civilians in the years prior
to the ICC’s entry into force might have killed “only” 82 civilians after entry into force, holding
all other variables at their mean. 132 The differences are statistically distinguishable and do
suggest some behavioral moderation after the ICC entered into force. Most importantly, these
results provide useful guidance on where to look for normative progress among potentially
violent non-state actors: those with both the incentive and the ability to control their troops.
131
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Conclusion

Few issues in international relations are more urgent than improving the life chances for
civilians who become pawns in civil war violence. Since the end of the Cold War, the
international community has been groping toward a way to end impunity with respect to the
worst human rights violations, especially in intrastate conflicts. The Yugoslavian and Rwandan
Tribunals were important milestones in this regard, but the most ambitious effort to date has been
the International Criminal Court. Few institutions have inspired such high hopes, while
stimulating so much controversy. Even though the Court has been operating for only twelve
years, it is time to supplement anecdotal speculation with careful study of its effects. As realists
Goldsmith and Krasner remind us, “ideals can be pursued effectively only if decision-makers are
alert to … the consequences of their policies.” 133
This study is an attempt to at least address the “chasm between theory and practice” 134
noted by ICC skeptics. First, we have been careful to specify exactly what it is we might expect
the ICC to do: to deter a significant crime category within its jurisdiction. This is not the only
consequence one might want to explore relating to the ICC, but it is one of its primary goals.
Civilian suffering as the result of intentional, strategic behavior by combatants has been one of
the more tragic outcomes of the explosion of civil wars in the past two decades.
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Second, we have theorized two broad and mutually reinforcing channels of potential
deterrence – prosecutorial and social deterrence – and specified the conditions under which we
might expect them to hold. We have argued that the ICC contributes directly to prosecutorial
deterrence by investigating and prosecuting international crimes on its own authority. It also
encourages member states to improve their capacity to reduce, detect, and prosecute such crimes
domestically. Indeed, ratifying states are much more likely than non-ratifiers to do so. As well,
there is strong evidence of a reduction in intentional civilian killing by government actors when
states implement ICC-consistent statutes in domestic criminal law, which we can reasonably
attribute, at least indirectly, to the ICC’s influence. Such domestic statutes magnify the ICC’s
prosecutorial deterrent effect by bolstering it with the added possibility of punishment at home.
Finally, it is critical to understand that legal rules interact with social pressures, both tangible
and intangible. The ICC also deters because it mobilizes the international community as well as
domestic civil society to demand justice. In this sense, our view of the ICC is fully consistent
with broader trends in human rights prosecutions at the local, regional and global level. 135
We want to stress that our claims are modulated. Persons who intentionally terrorize
civilians for their personal or political purposes are difficult to deter under any circumstances.
But the ICC has raised the risks of consequences for violations, through the channels we
discussed. We illustrate the plausibility of these channels but also demonstrate their limits.
Governments that depend on aid relationships are easier to deter than the more self-reliant,
largely because their economic dependence makes them more vulnerable to external actors who
use their resources to enforce broader community values. Rebels are harder to deter than
governments. Nonetheless, even rebels appear to have significantly reduced intentional civilian
135
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killing when the ICC has signaled its determination to prosecute. Debates over the effects of the
ICC have been sterile, largely because they have failed to specify the conditions under which one
might expect the Court to work.
We are not pushing the point that one prosecutor, acting alone and without significant
backing by the international community or local support, could have brought about these
consequences merely by issuing a decision to investigate or signing a warrant. ICC interventions
are powerful because they are part of a package of efforts to rally support for ending impunity.
Moreover, part of the package has taken time to unfold – a redoubling of domestic efforts to
develop the legal capacity to prosecute crimes against humanity and other egregious rights
abuses, which is precisely how the ICC’s complementarity is intended to operate. The evidence
suggests these efforts contributed to an indirect prosecutorial effect of the ICC itself, though only
for government officials. But the evidence also suggests that the ICC’s demonstrated
determination to investigate and issue warrants has contributed to the reduction of violence by
convincing even some types of rebel leaders that impunity is a waning option.
We are under no illusions that the Court has positive impacts in all cases. These are
average results, based on imperfectly measured exposures to prosecutorial and social risks and
costs. Our theory as well as empirical analysis of prosecutorial deterrence is probabilistic, not
deterministic. It is easy to point to conflicts that the ICC has not solved. The Bemba trial in
relation to the situation in the Central African Republic did not stop violence by the Seleka
faction, which reminds us that the Court cannot solve deep-rooted social problems in a short
period of time. 136 However, the Prosecutor prioritizes cases where violations are “grave” 137 and
136

Glasius 2009b.

137

ICC 2012, 6.
38

these are precisely cases where violence is prone to recur. ICC situations are some of the most
protracted cases of conflict in the world – a fact that makes the modest positive consequences we
document all the more remarkable.
The Court had its ten-year anniversary in 2012. It has yet to gain consistent support from
major powers like the US, China, Russia, and India which would boost its resources and
legitimacy. Although the ICC enjoys the support of 123 countries, observers note that the court
faces many practical challenges in its day-to-day operations, such as gathering evidence and
conducting quality fact-finding. 138 In many respects we agree. But its willingness to prosecute
has contributed to perceptions that impunity for egregious crimes against humanity is a
diminishing option. The evidence suggests that this role has potential to save at least a few lives
in some of the most violent settings in recent decades.

39

References
Achen, Christopher, and Duncan Snidal. 1989. Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparaitve
Case Studies. World Politics 41 (2):143//---//69.
Agnew, Robert. 2011. Control and Disorganization Theory. In The Routledge Handbook of
Deviant Behaviour, edited by Clifton D. Bryant, 114//---//20. New York: Routledge.
Ainley, Kirsten. 2011. The International Criminal Court on Trial. Cambridge Review of
International Affairs 24 (3):309//---//33.
Akhavan, Payam. 2005. The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of the First
State Referral to the International Criminal Court. American Journal of International Law
99 (2):403//---//21.
Bass, Gary. 2003. In the Hands of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Becker, Gary S. 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political
Economy 76 (2):169//---//217.
Bikundo, Edwin. 2012. The International Criminal Court and Africa: Exemplary Justice. Law
and Critique 23 (1):21//---//41.
Bueno, Olivia, and Gilbert Angwandi. 2012. Steps Towards Justice, Frustrated Hopes: Some
Reflections on the Experience of the International Criminal Court in Ituri. Discussion
paper 2, New York: International Refugee Rights Initiative.
Burke-White, William. 2010. Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and
National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice. Harvard International Law
Journal 49 (1):53//---//108.
Chapman, Terrence, and Stephen Chaudoin. 2013. Ratification Patterns and the International
Criminal Court. International Studies Quarterly 57 (2):400//---//9.
Chaudoin, Stephen. 2014. International Institutions and Contests Over Compliance: Kenya and
the International Criminal Court. Unpublished manuscript, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, Ill.
Clark, Phil. 2011. Chasing Cases: The ICC and the Politics of State Referral in the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Uganda. In The International Criminal Court and
Complementarity: From Theory to Practice, edited by Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M.
El Zeidy, 1180//---//1203. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Clark, Tom and Drew Linzer. 2015. Should I Use Fixed or Random Effects? Political Science
Research and Methods. 3 (2):399//---//408.Cohen, Dara, Amber Peterman, Tia Palermo,
and Amelia Hoover Green. 2011. Rape Reporting During War: Why the Numbers Don’t
Mean What You Think They Do. Foreign Affairs. Online edition. 1 August 2011.
Available at < https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-08-01/rape-reporting-duringwar>. Accessed 3 February 2014.
Cronin-Furman, Kate. 2013. Managing Expectations: International Criminal Trials and the
Prospects for Deterrence of Mass Atrocity. International Journal of Transitional Justice
7 (3):434//---//54.
Cunningham, David, Idean Salehyan, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch.2013. Non-State Actors in
Civil Wars: A New Dataset. Conflict Management and Peace Science 30 (5):516//---//31.

40

Dancy, Geoff, and Kathryn Sikkink. 2012. Ratification and Human Rights Prosecutions: Toward
a Transnational Theory of Treaty Compliance. New York University Journal of
Internatinal Law and Politics 44 (3):751//---//90.
Dancy, Geoff, and Florencia Montal. 2014. Unintended Positive Complementarity: Why
International Criminal Court Investigations Increase Domestic Human Rights
Prosecutions. Paper presented at American Society of International Law Conference,
November, Chicago.Drumbl, Mark. 2012. Reimagining Child Soldiers in International
Law and Policy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Dunoff, Jeffrey L., and Joel P. Trachtman. 1999. The Law and Economics of Humanitarian Law
Violation in Internal Conflict. The American Journal of International Law 93 (2):394//--//409.
Eck, Kristine, and Lisa Hultman 2007. One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights
from New Fatality Data. Journal of Peace Research 44 (2):233//---//246.
Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza. 1998. Determinants of Crime Rates
in Latin America and the World: An Empirical Assessment. Washington, D.C.: World
Bank.
Fazal, Tanisha M. 2013. Secessionism and Civilian Targeting. Unpublished manuscript,
University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind.
<------> .2014. Dead Wrong? Battle Deaths, Military Medicine, and Exaggerated Reports of
War’s Demise. International Security 39 (1):95//---//125.
Findlay, M. 2014. Sign Up or Sign Off - Asia's Reluctant Engagement with the International
Criminal Court. Cambodia Law and Policy Journal 1:75//---//95.
Fish, Eric. 2010. Peace through Complementarity: Solving the Ex Post Problem in International
Criminal Court Prosecutions. Yale Law Journal 119 (7):1703//---//14.
Franck, Thomas. 1990. The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Geerken, Michael R, and Walter R Gove. 1975. Deterrence: Some Theoretical Considerations.
Law & Society Review 9 (3):497//---//513.
Gilligan, Michael J. 2006. Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the
International Criminal Regime. International Organization 60 (4):935//---//67.
Glasius, Marlies. 2009a. We Ourselves, We Are Part of the Functioning: The ICC, Victims, and
Civil Society in the Central African Republic. African Affairs 108 (430):49//---//67.
<------>. 2009b. What Is Global Justice and Who Decides? Civil Society and Victim
Responses to the International Criminal Court’s First Investigations. Human Rights Quarterly
31 (2):496//---//520.
Goldsmith, Jack, and Stephen D. Krasner. 2003. The Limits of Idealism. Daedalus 132 (1):47//--//63.
Goldstein, Joshua S. 2011. Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide.
New York: Dutton.
Goodman, Ryan, and Derek Jinks. 2003. Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties.
European Journal of International Law 14 (1):171//---//83.
Goodliffe, Jay, and Darren Hawkins. 2009. A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Rome:
Explaining International Criminal Court Negotiations. Journal of Politics 71 (3):977//--//97.
41

Goodliffe, Jay, Darren Hawkins, Christine Horne, and Daniel Nielson. 2012. Dependence
Networks and the International Criminal Court. International Studies Quarterly 56
(1):131//---//47.
Gorur, Aditi. 2012. Striking While the Iron's Hot: The Case for Humanitarian Engagement with
M23 after Goma. Washington, D.C.: The Stimson Center. Available at
<http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/striking-while-the-irons-hot-the-case-forhumanitarian-engagement-with-m23-after-goma/>. Accessed 15 October 2013.
Grammer, Christoph. 2004. The Rome Statute Regime as a Mainspring of International Criminal
Law: The Success of the Rome Statute in Latin America and the Opposition of the USA.
Heidelberg Journal of International Law 64 (4):1059//---//76.
Grasmick, Harold G., and George J. Bryjak. 1980. The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity of
Punishment. Social Forces 59 (2):471//---//91.
Grono, Nick. 2012. The Deterrent Effect of the ICC on the Commission of International Crimes
by Government Leaders. Speech delivered at the International Crisis Group, New York, 5
October 2012. Available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publicationtype/speeches/2012/grono-the-deterrent-effect-of-the-icc.aspx>. Accessed 20 October 2014.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2013. Making Human Rights a Reality. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press.
Hamilton, Rebecca J. 2014. The ICC’s Exit Problem. New York University Journal of
International Law and Politics 47 (1):1//---//58.
Hilbe, Joseph M. 2007. Negative Binomial Regression. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Hillebrecht, Courtney. 2014. Domestic Politics and International Human Rights Tribunals: The
Problem of Compliance. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Huang, Reyko. 2013. Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of
the American Political Science Association, August, Chicago.
Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. 2013. United Nations Peacekeeping and
Civilian Protection in Civil War. American Journal of Political Science 57 (4):875//--//91.
Iacus, Stefano M., Gary King, and Giuseppe Porro. 2012. Causal Inference without Balance
Checking: Coarsened Exact Matching. Political Analysis 20 (1):1//---//24.
International Criminal Court (ICC). 2006. Office of the Prosecutor. Third Report of the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to
UNSCR 1593 (2005). The Hague: ICC.
<------>. 2011. Report of the Court on Complementarity Report to the Assembly of States
Parties. 10th sess. New York, 12//---//21 December 2011. ICC-ASP/10/23.

<------>. 2012. Office of the Prosecutor. Prosecutorial Strategy: 2009//---//2012.

The Hague:

ICC.
Ipsos-Synovate. 2011. Confirmation Hearings Boost Support for the ICC Process. Available at <
http://www.ipsos.co.ke/spr/downloads/downloads.php?dir=polls&file=Level%20of%20S
upport%20for%20the%20ICC%20process%20(October%202011).pdf >. Accessed 5
March 2014.
42

Jo, Hyeran. 2015. Compliant Rebels: Rebel Groups and International Law in World Politics.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Jo, Hyeran, and Catarina Thomson. 2014. Legitimacy and Compliance with International Law:
Access to Detainees in Civil Conflicts 1991//---//2006. British Journal of Political
Science 44 (2):323-55.
Kahan, Dan M. 1997. Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence. Virginia Law Review
83 (2):349//---//95.
Kim, Hunjoon, and Kathryn Sikkink. 2010. Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights
Prosecutions for Transitional Countries. International Studies Quarterly 54 (4):939//--//63.
King, Gary, James Honaker, Anne Joseph, and Kenneth Scheve. 2001. Analyzing Incomplete
Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation. American
Political Science Review 95 (1):49//---//69.
Kleiman, Mark. 2009. When Brute Force Fails : How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Klick, Jonathan, and Alexander Tabarrok. 2010. Police, Prisons and Punishment: The Empirical
Evidence on Crime Deterrence. In Handbook on the Economics of Crime, edited by
Bruce L. Benson and Paul R. Zimmerman, 127//---//44. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Klick, Jonathan, John MacDonald, and Thomas Stratmann. 2012. Mobile Phones and Crime
Deterrence: An Underappreciated Link. In Research Handbook on the Economics of
Criminal Law, edited by Alon Harel and Keith N. Hylton, 243//---//56. Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar.
Kleffner, Jann K. 2008. Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal
Jurisdictions. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Koskenniemi, Martti. 2002. Between Impunity and Show Trials. Max Planck Yearbook of
United Nations Law 6(1):1//---//32.
Ku, Julian, and Jide Nzelibe. 2006. Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate
Humanitarian Atrocities? Washington University Law Review 84 (4):777//---//833.
Lessa, Francesca, and Leigh Payne, eds. 2012. Amnesty in the Age of Human Rights
Accountability: Comparative and International Perspectives. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Lupu, Yonatan. 2013. Best Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic Judicial Enforcement
of International Human Rights Agreements. International Organization 67 (3):469//--//503.
McCarthy, Bill. 2002. New Economics of Sociological Criminology. Annual Review of
Sociology 28:417//---//42.
McKay, Fiona. 2004. The Role of Human Rights NGOs in Relation to ICC Investigations.
Discussion Paper. New York: Human Rights First.
Meernik, James, and Jamie Shairick. 2011. Promoting International Humanitarian Law: Strong
States and the Ratification of the ICC Treaty. International Area Studies Review 14
(2):23//---//48.
Meernik, James, Rosa Aloisi, Marsha Sowell, and Angela Nichols. 2012. The Impact of Human
Rights Organizations on Naming and Shaming Campaigns. Journal of Conflict
Resolution 56 (2):233//---//56.

43

Mendeloff, David. 2014. Punish or Persuade? The ICC and the Limits to Coercion in Cases of
Ongoing Violence. Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International
Studies Association, March, Toronto, Canada.
Mitchell, Sara, and Emilia Justyna Powell. 2011. Domestic Law Goes Global: Legal Traditions
and International Court. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Morrow, James. 2014. Order within Anarchy: The Laws of War as an International Institution.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Moustafa, Tamir. 2014. Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes. Annual Review of Law and
Social Science 10:281//---//99.
Mueller, Susanne D. 2014. Kenya and the International Criminal Court: Politics, the Election and
the Law. Journal of Eastern African Studies 8 (1):25//---//42.
Mullins, Christopher W., and Dawn L. Rothe. 2010. The Ability of the International Criminal
Court to Deter Violations of International Criminal Law: A Theoretical Assessment.
International Criminal Law Review 10 (5):771//---//86.
Mushanga, Tibamanya Mwene. 2011. Criminology in Africa. 2d ed. Nairobi, Kenya: LawAfrica.
Nagin, Daniel S. 1998. Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century.
Crime and Justice 23 (1):1//---//42.
Nagin, Daniel S., and Raymond Paternoster. 1993. Enduring Individual Differences and Rational
Choice Theories of Crime. Law and Society Review 27 (3):467//---//96.
Nagin, Daniel S., and Greg Pogarsky. 2001. Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal
Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence.
Criminology 39 (4):865//---//92.
Neumayer, Eric. 2005. Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human
Rights? Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (6):925//---//53.
Nielsen, Richard. 2013. Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions against Repressive
States. International Studies Quarterly 57 (4):791//---//803.
Nouwen, Sarah. 2014. Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The Catalysing Effect of the
International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Nouwen, Sarah, and Wouter Werner. 2011. Doing Justice to the Political: The International
Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan. European Journal of International Law 21
(4):941//---//65.
O’Brien, Éadaoin, Par Engstrom, and David Cantor. 2011. In the Shadow of the ICC: Colombia
and International Criminal Justice. London: Human Rights Consortium, University of
London.
Open Society Foundation. 2010. Promoting Complementarity in Practice: Lessons from Three
ICC Situation Countries. Open Society Justice Initiative Report to the Assembly of States
Parties, 7 December 2010. New York: Open Society Foundation.
Pinker, Steven. 2011. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New York:
Viking.
Rincke, Johannes, and Christian Traxler. 2011. Enforcement Spillovers. Review of Economics
and Statistics 93 (4):1224//---//34.
Risse, Thomas, Steve C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. 1999. The Power of Human Rights:
International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
44

Rodman, Kenneth. 2008. Darfur and the Limits of Legal Deterrence. Human Rights Quarterly 30
(3):529//---//60.
Schabas, William. 2011. An Introduction to the International Criminal Court. 4th ed. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Sikkink, Kathryn. 2011. The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing
World Politics. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Simmons, Beth A. 2009. Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Simmons, Beth A., and Allison M. Danner. 2010. Credible Commitments and the International
Criminal Court. International Organization 64 (2):225//---//56.
Sivakumaran, Sandesh. 2012. The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie, and William Burke-White. 2006. The Future of International Law Is
Domestic. Harvard International Law Journal 47 (2):327//---//52.
Snyder, Jack, and Leslie Vinjamuri. 2003. Trials and Erros: Principle and Pragmatism in
Strategies of International Justice. International Security 28 (3):5//---//44.
Stahn, Carsten, and Mohamed El Zeidy. 2011. The International Criminal Court and
Complementarity: From Theory to Practice. Vol. I and II. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Terracino, Julio. 2007. National Implementation of ICC Crimes: Impact of National Jurisdictions
and the ICC. Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 (2):421//---//40.
Themnér, Lotta, and Peter Wallensteen. 2013. Armed Conflicts, 1946//---//2012. Journal of
Peace Research 50 (4):509//---//21.
Tittle, Charles R. 1980. Sanctions and Social Deviance: The Question of Deterrence. New York:
Praeger.
Tittle, Charles R., Ekaterina V. Botchkovar, and Olena Antonaccio. 2011. Criminal
Contemplation, National Context, and Deterrence. Journal of Quantitative Criminology
27 (2):225//---//49.
Tyler, Tom. 2006. Why People Obey the Law. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Ulfelder, Jay, and Benjamin Valentino. 2008. Assessing Risks of State-Sponsored Mass Killing.
Research Report, Political Instability Task Force, Arlington, Va.
Uppsala Conflict Data Program. 2013. UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2013. Uppsala,
Sweden: Uppsala University. Available at <www.ucdp.uu.se>. Accessed 20 January
2014.
Walter, Barbara F. 2009. Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, Kirk R, and Richard Hawkins. 1986. Perceptual Research on General Deterrence: A
Critical Review. Law and Society Review 20 (4):545//---//72.
Weinstein, Jeremy. 2007. Inside Rebellion: Politics of Insurgent Violence. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Wright, Valerie. 2010. Deterrence in Criminal Justice: Evaluating Certainty vs. Severity of
Punishment. Washington, D.C.: The Sentencing Project.
Zimring, Franklin E., and Gordon Hawkins. 1973. Deterrence; the Legal Threat in Crime
Control. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

45

TABLE 1. Expectations
I. Prosecutorial deterrence
hypotheses:
Direct:
A. Ratification of the ICC statutes is associated with a
reduction of violence against civilians by state actors.
B. ICC actions, such as preliminary examinations,
investigations, and prosecutions are associated with a
reduction of violence against civilians by both state and
non-state actors.
Indirect:

A. Civilian killing should decrease when states implement
ICC-consistent domestic criminal statutes.

II. Social deterrence
hypotheses:

A. Civilian killing by government forces should decrease the
greater a state’s dependence on foreign aid.
B. Civilian killing by governments should decrease when
human rights organizations are mobilized to demand
accountability.
C. Civilian killing should decrease for secessionist rebel groups
with internal discipline.
All of these effects (IIA-IIC) should be amplified where the
ICC is in force.
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TABLE 2. ICC effect on civilian killing by governments
Model 1
ICC ratification

ICC Ratification
ICC Actions
Domestic Crime Statute

Model 2
ICC actions

Model 3
ICC
complementarity

-0.632**
(0.261)
-0.562***
(0.209)
-0.489**
(0.215)

Model 4
All ICC effects

Model 5
Social
deterrence mobilization

Model 6
Social
deterrence - aid

Model 7
Underlying
preferences

-0.482*
(0.267)
-0.524**
(0.208)
-0.397*
(0.222)

-0.553**
(0.265)

0.108
(0.317)

-0.508*
(.270)
-0.490**
(0.210)
-0.344
(0.230)

Ratification*Aid Pressure

-0.074***
(0.024)
0.010
(0.007)

Aid Pressure
Ratification*HRO Growth

-0.022*
(0.013)
0.003
(0.004)

HRO Growth
Peace Preference

0.397***
(0.135)
Justice Preference
-0.391***
(0.155)
Political Regime Type
-0.008
-0.017
-0.013
-0.007
-0.013
-0.011
-0.007
(0.016)
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.016)
Rule of Law
-0.439***
-0.427***
-0.400***
-0.417***
-0.439***
-0.443***
-0.373***
(0.120)
(0.121)
(0.120)
(0.120)
(0.125)
(0.125)
(0.121)
On-going Civil War
2.216***
2.263***
2.225***
2.199***
2.172***
2.188***
2.076***
(0.210)
(0.211)
(0.210)
(0.210)
(0.220)
(0.222)
(0.211)
Rebel Killing
0.0001***
0.0001***
0.0001***
0.0001***
0.0001***
0.0001***
0.0001***
(0.00003)
(0.00003)
(0.00003)
(0.00003)
(0.00003)
(0.00003)
(0.00003)
Post ICC Regime
1.960***
1.882***
1.898***
1.954***
1.646**
1.770**
1.891***
(0.678)
(0.680)
(0.677)
(0.675)
(0.739)
(0.744)
(0.674)
Observations
2,264
2,264
2,264
2,264
2,163
2,163
2,264
Number of countries
101
101
101
101
100
100
101
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the count of civilians killed intentionally by government forces. Results are based on a
negative binomial panel analysis with random effects. Year fixed effects are included but not reported. Constants are suppressed.
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*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.10
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TABLE 3. ICC effect on civilian killing by rebel groups
Model 1
ICC ratification

ICC Ratification

Model 2
ICC actions

Model 3
ICC complementarity

Model 4
All ICC effects

0.138
(0.118)
0.214**
(0.102)

0.328
(0.223)
-0.197***
(0.0553)
0.197
(0.124)
0.198*
(0.103)

0.287
(0.222)

ICC Actions

-0.186***
(0.0540)

Domestic Crime Statute
Rule of Law
Secessionist Rebels

Model 5
Social deterrence
without ICC

Model 6
Social deterrence
with ICC

-0.641***
(0.144)

-1.086**
(0.423)
-0.172
(0.121)
0.285
(0.200)
0.628***
(0.185)
-0.404***

Secessionist*Discipline*Post ICC
Secessionist*Discipline
Discipline*Post ICC
Discipline/Central Command and
Control
Political Regime Type
Post ICC Regime
Rebel Strength
Government Killing
Observations
Number of rebel groups

-0.0393***
(0.0107)
0.106
(0.127)
0.216**
(0.0895)
0.00000891***
(0.000000959)
2,196
260

-0.0368***
(0.0107)
0.456***
(0.140)
0.232***
(0.0892)
0.0000089***
(0.000000951)
2,196
260

-0.0584***
(0.0141)
0.0975
(0.125)
0.263***
(0.0936)
0.00000898***
(0.000000946)
2,196
260

-0.0553***
(0.0142)
0.342**
(0.147)
0.259***
(0.0935)
0.00000897***
(0.000000953)
2,196
260

-0.0260**
(0.0110)
0.123
(0.122)
0.185**
(0.0895)
0.00000888***
(0.00000094)
2,196
260

(0.124)
-0.0310***
(0.0110)
-0.994***
(0.364)
0.271***
(0.0938)
0.00000891***
(0.00000103)
2,196
260

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses . The dependent variable is the count of civilians killed by rebel groups. Results are based on a negative binomial panel
analysis with random effects. Constants are suppressed.
*** p<0.01
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** p<0.05
* p<0.10
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FIGURE 1. Estimated effect of prosecutorial risks on intentional civilian killing
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Note: Figure 1 illustrates the estimated effect of three indicators of increased ICC
prosecutorial risk on a hypothetical government or rebel group that has
intentionally killed 100 civilians in a given year. For such a case 100 deaths
represent “no effect.” The estimated deaths given a one-unit shift in the
prosecutorial variable noted with a point estimate and 95% confidence interval.
They are based on the incidence-rate ratios estimated from Models 1-3 in Table 2
(for governments) and from Models 1-3 in Table 3 (for rebels). The estimated
effect of Ratification is from Model 1; ICC Action is from Model 2; and Domestic
Crime Statute is from Model 3.
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FIGURE 2. Marginal effects of mobilization on civilian killing
conditional on ICC ratification
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Note: The marginal effects are predicted counts of yearly average civilian
killing by a government actor. The effects were calculated based on Model
5 in Table 2. The effects are reported for the values within ±2 standard
deviation of HRO Growth variable.
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FIGURE 3. Marginal effects of aid pressure on civilian killing
conditional on ICC ratification
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Note: The marginal effects are predicted counts of yearly average civilian
killing by a government actor. The effects were calculated based on Model
6 in Table 2. The effects are reported for the values within ±3 standard
deviation of Aid Pressure variable.
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FIGURE 4. Battle-related deaths and government civilian killing
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Note: Battle-related Deaths are from UCDP’s Battle-related Deaths Dataset v.52013. Civilian Killing Counts are from the One-sided Violence Dataset v.1.42013. See Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2013; and Eck and Hultman 2007.
Rwanda drives the peak in 1994. The OSV data records that the Hutu government
killed 15000 Tutsis but the number is not counted as “battle-related” in the UCDP
data.
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